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Taxpayer Standing in the Wake of
Flast v. Cohen
I. Introduction
The subject matter jurisdiction of the United States courts is limited in
part by the constitutional restriction of their review to "cases" and
"controversies." 1 This limitation has infused federal practice with many
rules concerning "justiciability"; the determination whether a question
presented by litigants is a proper object of judicial scrutiny. One of these
rules, the requirement of standing, differs from the rest in that it examines
the litigants rather than the litigation. "In deciding questions of standing
the focus is on the party seeking relief rather than on 'whether the issue
itself is justiciable.' "2 In order to achieve a favorable standing determina-
tion the plaintiff in any3 action must show that "he personally would
benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention." 4 The variety of
interests that the federal courts have deemed worthy of their protection
makes the law of federal standing a baffling trap that ensnares the unwitting
litigant long before he can ever argue the merits of his case. Particular
complexities inhere in the eliminative rules that govern the ability of a
federal taxpayer to stand and challenge the spending policies of his national
government. This comment evaluates the chances of a litigant who asserts
taxpayer standing in the aftermath of Flast v. Cohen.5
II. Standing in Context
The student of standing must take care to remember that standing is
not the only limitation on the courts' case loads. Rather it combines with
1. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority ;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls ;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States ;-between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
2. Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 407 F. Supp. 257, 258 (D.D.C. 1976).
3. The law of standing is almost exclusively concerned with such public law
questions as determinations of constitutionality and review of administrative or
other governmental action. In theory, of course, it is not so limited. The person
suing for breach of contract or for a tort must satisfy the court that he has standing
to bring such a suit, but in practice such suits are brought only by persons harmed
by the supposed wrong, and his standing to sue is self-evident.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 39 (2d ed. 1970).
4. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
5. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
other rules to form the larger doctrine of justiciability, 6 the function of
which the United States Supreme Court has defined as a reinforcement of
the judiciary's role in the system of tripartite allocation of federal power.
7
Justiciability limits judicial action and guarantees an adversarial presenta-
tion of the issues in a historically legitimate fashion.8 History, however, is
not the sole progenitor of the modern doctrine of justiciability, 9 nor is
standing its sole component.
A. Justiciability-The Big Picture
The Supreme Court will not review a state court's determination of
federal law if the holding can be supported by the state's constitution,
statutes or common law.10 At the base of this well-known tenet is the
federal courts' abhorrence of advisory opinions. 1 If the resolution of a
federal question would leave the parties as they were before the invocation
of the Court's power, the Court will refuse to act. 12 The law will not do a
useless thing.
Federal jurisdiction does not require that the parties to an action have a
real disagreement as to law, facts or proper outcome. ' 3 Nonetheless, cases
in which one party controls both sides of the litigation lose the requisite
adversity; 4 their character changes from litigation to the judicial appeal of
the parties' legislative disappointments. 15 When constitutional require-
ments of controversy are absent, the courts are loath to engage in an ad hoc
"Madisonian" review. 
16
The controversy requirement also dismisses plaintiffs whose interests
would no longer benefit from a judicial determination of rights and
duties,17 either because of a private settlement and satisfaction or because
time has resolved the conflict. 8 The famous exception to this rule allows
6. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 39 (2d ed. 1970).
7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
8. Id.
9. The Supreme Court has noted that since English judges in the Eighteenth Century
were free to issue advisory opinions, the case or controversy requirement represents "the
implicit policies embodied in Article Three." Id. at 95.
10. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22
(1923).
11. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
12. Id.
13. In cases of guilty pleas to criminal charges, for example, the lack of disagreement
does not stay the exercise of judicial power.
14. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911); United States v. Johnson,
319 U.S. 503 (1943).
15. "It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative
act." Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1891).
16. At the Constitutional Convention in 1787 Madison and Randolph, both of Virginia,
argued in favor of the so-called "Virginia Plan." The eighth resolution of this plan provided
that, "[T]he Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose
a council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it
shall operate." 2 FARLAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 74 (1911).
Obviously, this policy of automatic review is antithetic to the case and controversy require-
ment and has never been judicially recognized either in theory or application. See U.S.
CONsT. art. III.
17. See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
18. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
plaintiffs whose injuries are "capable of repetition, yet evading review" 19
to appeal even though they bring no "live" argument to the appellate
courts.20
The requirement that plaintiffs allege an injury at the defendant's
hands2' has as its corollary the need that that injury alleged be real and
concrete rather than speculative and imaginary. 22 Although the qualitative
nature of cognizable injury has undergone great expansion, 21 the necessity
of its existence has remained unchallenged.24 Similarly, federal approval
of declaratory judgments has not given litigants a remedy in advance of
need.
2
Under the separation of powers doctrine, matters that lie without the
jurisdiction of federal courts are deemed political and thus non-
justiciable. 26 In Baker v. Carr 27 the Court enunciated this doctrine:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitution-
al commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolu-
tion without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potential-
ity of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by vari-
ous departments on one question.28
Though often cited, 29 Baker's formulation must be read with the knowl-
edge that neither the specter of ensuing embarassment nor a need for
discretion will often stay a court's hand. 30 Also, the acknowledged position
of the judiciary as the final expositor of the law 3' removes the danger of
multifarious pronouncements.
B. Standing: The Role of the Plaintiff
More than the other components of justiciability, standing deals with
the identities of the parties rather than with the substantive issues they
19. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.498, 515 (1911).
20. See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968);
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
21. International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222
(1954).
22. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
23. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970), in which the Court recognized the justiciability of injuries to aesthetic, recreation-
al, and conservational interests.
24. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
25. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
26. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433
(1939).
27. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
28. Id. at 217.
29. See, e.g., Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
30. DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
raise. 32 Certainly, those issues have collateral relevance to the standing
problem, 33 and, in fact, an initial look at the issues may identify them as
non-justiciable and thereby eliminate the need for a standing determina-
tion. 34 Nonetheless, the classic articulation of the standing problem dem-
onstrates its concern with the litigants.
Have the [plaintiffs] alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverse-
ness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
tional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing.35
A personal stake in the outcome is common to the various forms of
standing; the variety results from the qualitative differences among accept-
able stakes. That variety, though considerable and expanding,36 is limited
by the rule that "the interest sought to be protected [must be] arguably
within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question.
3 7
1. "Injury in Fact" Standing.-The first requirement of the "in-
jury in fact" test is that an injury to a cognizable interest be demonstrated.
As the law of standing has recently undergone great changes, 38 recognition
of the qualitative sufficiency of plaintiffs' interests has become more
liberal. While the most basic cognizable interest remains economic, the
federal courts now recognize injury to "aesthetic, conservational [or]
recreational" 3 9 values as adequate to support litigation. The expanded
"injury in fact" definition has led, for example, to the entertainment of
challenges to the Viet Nam conflict in which the injuries alleged were the
depletion of the nation's human resources,' the increased danger to which
a soldier with combat orders was exposed, 4' and the war-spawned infla-
tionary spiral.4 2 Also allowed has been an attack on increased railroad
freight rates, in which the injury alleged was the depletion of natural
resources,43 and, in dictum, the attack on a wilderness development project
32. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
33. [T]o determine standing it is necessary to look to substantive issues in the
litigation, not to evaluate ultimate merit, but to determine whether there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted . . . and the claim sought to be adjudicated.
Langendorf v. Administrators of the Tulans Educ. Fund., 528 F.2d 1076, 1077 (5th Cir. 1976).
34. See DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973).
35. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
36. See S. v. D., 410 U.S 614 (1973).
37. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970). For the plaintiff in a private action, a right established by the common law will of
course suffice.
38. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
39. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
40. Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
41. Orlando v. Laird, 448F.2d 1029(2d Cir. 1971). The result is different if the plaintiffs
are members of the Armed Forces without combat orders. There, the injury is speculative
instead of concrete and the plaintiffs have no standing. Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th
Cir. 1972).
42. Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
43. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), plaintiffs were given standing on
the strength of their allegation that the increased freight rates would harm the local recycling
in which plaintiffs could have alleged an injury to their enjoyment of the
outdoors. 4 The expansion has not, however, removed all barriers to
judicial recognition of sufficient interests. In Szmodis v. Romney,45 for
example, the court refused to allow a contractor to litigate the propriety of a
construction bid that he lost.46
The second part of the "injury in fact" test requires the plaintiff to
allege that he, himself, has suffered or will suffer as a result of the
challenged action.4 7 Injury in fact standing does not allow an attack on an
unfelt injury 48 or one that is felt by someone other than the plaintiff.4 9
2. Jus Tertii Standing.-Special rules govern those cases in which
the plaintiff can stand to assert the rights of a third person. The narrow
limits defined by these rules reflect the policy of judicial self-restraint that
usually forces a plaintiff to litigate only "his own constitutional rights or
immunities." 50 Nonetheless, if the nature of the jus tertii is such as to
preclude assertion by the third person 51 and if the relationship between the
third person and the plaintiff makes such litigation appropriate,5 2 the
plaintiff will have standing. Such cases are exceptional, however, and jus
tertii standing should be viewed as a small, albeit often significant, chink
in the armor of injury in fact.53
programs and so new resources would have to be consumed. Conservational standing was
also recognized in Scenic Hudson Preserv. Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965).
44. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Although plaintiffs could have easily
alleged such an injury, the failure to do so turned this case into the litigation of a "concern"
and so left plaintiffs without standing.
45. 307 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
46. Id. The limitations on "injury in fact" standing, as with all other types of standing,
are more qualitative than quantitative. All agree that the tiniest of actual injuries will suffice.
See, e.g., Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the court said: "'The
specific, distinct injury may be small, but some such injury must be alleged for the litigant to
have standing." Id. at 1275. In State of Louisiana, Dep't of Coin. and Indus. v. Wein-
berger, 404 F. Supp. 894, 896 (E.D. La. 1975), the court noted that, "It is sufficient if this
interest is no more than an 'identifiable trifle.' "
47. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
48. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969).
49. In Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Supreme Court denied plaintiff
standing to litigate the constitutionality of the racially exclusive membership policies of a
private club, absent a showing that he had sought and been refused membership for reasons of
his race. Plaintiff was, however, able to litigate the constitutionality of discriminatory service
policies on the showing that he had been denied service.
50. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960).
51. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), plaintiff was granted standing to litigate
the rights of those third persons who could not receive contraceptives due to a Massachusetts
statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 2 1, which made the distribution of contraceptives a
crime. Plaintiff was arrested for violation of that statute and the Court, in granting him
standing to litigate its constitutionality, noted that the third persons "denied access to
contraceptives in Massachusetts . . .are not themselves subject to prosecution and, to that
extent, are denied a forum in which to assert their own rights." 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
52. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), plaintiff, a licensed physician and
the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, was allowed to
assert the rights of those with whom he shared a physician-patient relationship. In Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), defendant, a real estate seller, was permitted to assert in his own
defense to an action for breach of a racially exclusive covenant the rights of those minority
group buyers whose rights to equal protection were being violated; thus the Court recognized
the vendor-vendee relationship as sufficient to permit the assertion of jus tertii.
53. Its significance stems, in part, from the courts' propensity to allow jus tertii
standing in cases in which the standing question is especially difficult and the rights asserted
3. Motivational Standing .- An even smaller chink in that armor is
motivational standing. Plaintiffs without an injury in fact have often sought
standing by contending that their deeply felt concern over an issue has
moved them to seek justice by attacking the offensive statute or program.
This type of standing has met almost universal rejection by the courts,5"
with perhaps the most authoritative repudiation occurring in Sierra Club v.
Morton." There, plaintiff sought to use the remedies available under
Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act 56 and sued to enjoin the
transformation of the scenic Mineral King Valley National Park into a
tourist resort. The suit failed for want of standing as Sierra Club alleged no
injury, not even recreational or aesthetic, but only a "special interest in the
conservation and sound maintenance of the national parks." 57 The Court's
oft-quoted reply will bear one more repetition.
[A] mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding
the interest and no matter how qualified the [plaintiff] is in
evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the
organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved' within the
meaning of the APA.58
The willingness of a few courts to allow suits by "motivated"
plaintiffs, however, suggests transition in this area of the law. In School
District v. Schempp59 the Court allowed plaintiff to challenge compulsory
religious education, saying a person or family may have a spiritual stake in
first amendment values sufficient to create standing to raise issues concern-
ing the establishment and free exercise clauses. 60 In Atlee v. Laird6 1 the
court allowed a plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of the war in Viet
Nam, saying "[tihere are few citizens who could be so callous as to be
unmoved by the almost daily reports in the media of the death and
destruction being caused by this war." 62 In neither School District nor
Atlee was the standing grant reviewed by the Supreme Court; in fact, the
especially crucial. For example, in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), the Court
relaxed its rules in order to hear a first amendment freedom of speech case. In Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493 (1972), the Court allowed a white criminal defendant to attack a jury selection
system which excluded Blacks. In Peters it is not even clear whose rights plaintiff sought to
assert-those of excluded jurors or those of Black criminal defendants. And yet the Court,
untroubled by this vagueness, stated:
In light of the great potential for harm latent in an unconstitutional jury-selection
system, and the strong interest of the criminal defendant in avoiding that harm, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of giving the opportunity for challenging the jury
to too many defendants, rather than giving it to too few.
Id. at 504.
54. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903). "[Plaintiff] could not maintain a bill for a mere declaration in the air." fd. at 486.
55. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
57. 405 U.S. at 730.
58. Id. at 739.
59. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
60. Id. at 224.
61. 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
62. Id. at 1356. The Atlee court did not, however, claim to be initiating a policy of
motivational standing. Rather, it identified its present grant as an extraordinary relaxation of
the general rule justified by the tremendous importance of the issues before it. This resembles
the relaxation of rules in which the Supreme Court has indulged in cases of jus tertii standing
and so has at least theoretical validity. See note 53 supra.
closest the Court has come to expressly allowing motivational standing has
been Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Flast v. Cohen: "Perhaps the
vital interest of a citizen in the establishment issue without reference to his
taxpayer's status, would be acceptable as a basis for this challenge. We
need not decide this. "63 Indeed, realizing that every issue motivates
someone, the Court has avoided opening this back door to a "general
supervision of the constitutionality of the acts of [Congress]. "I Spiritual
or psychic suffering has not yet become an injury to a "cognizable
interest."
4. Citizen Standing.-Another common approach taken by an
uninjured challenger of congressional action is the attempt to gain citizen
standing. This is akin to motivational standing in that the citizen plaintiff
relies exclusively on his concern over his government's actions and his
interest in constitutional rule. Though more will be said of this later ,65
suffice for the present to realize that the citizen plaintiff has met no greater
acceptance than his motivated cousin.
5. Parens Patriae.-In Massachusetts v. Mellon66 the plaintiff
state sought to protect its citizens from allegedly unconstitutional action of
the federal government. The Court disallowed this attempt saying that the
United States, as well as the individual state, is parens patriae of the
citizens of that state. The federal government will therefore protect its
people and no state can stand to challenge this "protection.' '67 Mellon may
also support the proposition that no state can stand to sue in its own behalf
to prevent the federal government from invading its sovereignty. Whether
Mellon actually supports this theory, or whether the state's attempt to bring
such a suit is frustrated by the political nature of the question, 68 is
unclear. 69
The plaintiff who, without an injury in fact, seeks to attack uncon-
stitutional federal action is thus without standing to sue as citizen or
concerned person, and is likewise deprived of the protection of his state's
government. To date, his only chance has been taxpayer standing.
63. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 115 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring).
64. Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
65. See notes 141-48 and accompanying text infra.
66. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
67. See also Baxley v. Rotland, 409 F. Supp. 1249, 1257 (M.D. Ala. 1976) and the cases
cited therein for the proposition that, "It is settled that the State has no standing as the parent
of its citizens to attack acts of Congress as violative of provisions of the Constitution of the
United States .. " In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), the Court
allowed a parens patriae action in which Georgia, on behalf of her citizens, brought an
antitrust action against twenty railway companies. In Georgia, the plaintiff state did not seek
to protect her citizen from federal law but rather to protect them with federal law.
68. Both the standing and justiciability inquiries lead to the same conclusion, however.
69. This uncertainty results from the Court's citation of Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Wall) 50 (1867), in which the plaintiff state sued to enjoin the enforcement of certain
congressional enactments that would have allegedly destroyed some or all of the state's
sovereignty. The Court refused to hear the case. In Mellon the Court calls this refusal
appropriate since the case "called for a judgment upon a political question and presented no
case within the jurisdiction of the Court." 262 U.S. at 483.
III. The Taxpayer as Plaintiff
A. Before Flast v. Cohen
Certainly the most significant case in the area of taxpayer standing
before 1968 was Frothingham v. Mellon.7" The plaintiff, Mrs. Frothing-
ham, sought to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds on a health care
program aimed at the reduction of infant and maternal mortality. 7' Plain-
tiff's contention was that because health care was a state concern and not a
national one, this program violated the tenth amendment of the United
States Constitution. 72 Furthermore, she contended that the expenditures
under the program would necessarily increase her tax liability and that the
alleged unconstitutionality of those expenditures thus resulted in a depriva-
tion of property without due process of law. The Court denied Mrs.
Frothingham taxpayer standing to sue, basing its denial on three theories.
First, the Court noted that many times in the nation's history Congress has
appropriated federal money for non-federal objects; at none of these times
has a taxpayer plaintiff received standing to challenge the expenditure.
Second, a grant of standing to Mrs. Frothingham would have necessarily
allowed suits by any taxpayer who desired to enjoin any spending program;
the vision of such a flood of litigation with all its "attendant inconveni-
ences . . .[went] far to sustain the conclusion" 73 of the Court. Third, the
Court dismissed Mrs. Frothingham's attempt to compare her suit to ones in
which a municipal taxpayer sues to challenge municipal actions. Though
municipal taxpayer standing74 and state taxpayer standing75 are recognized
doctrines, federal taxpayer standing differs, said the Court in Frothing-
ham, in that the latter plaintiff's alleged interest was too "remote,
fluctuating and uncertain" 7 6 and the cause "a matter of public and not of
individual concern." 7 7 Without the requisite specificity Mrs. Frothing-
ham's suit seemed too much like an attempt to force the Court to review and
annul acts of Congress on the bare ground that they were unconstitution-
al. 78 The same abhorrence of automatic judicial supervision of the legisla-
tive branch that defeats collusive suits and political question litigation kept
Mrs. Frothingham out of court.
70. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
71. Act of November 23, 1921, 42 Stat. 224, c. 135.
72. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
73. 262 U.S. at 487.
74. See, e.g., Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879).
75. See, e.g., Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
76. 262 U.S. at 487.
77. Id. The Court never discussed the imagined difference of state taxpayer suits in this
regard.
78. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
B. Flast v. Cohen
The taxpayer standing picture changed in 196879 when Florence Flast
and six other federal taxpayers sued to enjoin the spending of federal
money under titles one and two of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965.80 After a dismissal by a three-judge district court 8' the
plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court82 in their attempt to stop
the government from financing the instruction of several secular subjects in
religious schools. The gravamen of the complaint was that the objection-
able titles of the Education Act deprived plaintiffs of their right to free
exercise of religion, as guaranteed by the first amendment,8 3 by constitut-
ing a compulsory tax for religious purposes. Significantly, though the
outcome and theory of Flast has enormous potential and promise for
taxpayer plaintiffs in general, the Court emphasized the particular injury
alleged: deprivation of religious freedom. Indeed, the opinion begins with
a cautionary exposition of its limited applicability: "In this case, we must
decide whether the Frothingham barrier should be lowered when a
taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.''84
Having thus narrowed the issue, the Court faced three questions: (1) Is
Frothingham an articulation of constitutional law or a declaration of
judicial policy? (2) If Frothingham was, in fact, a policy decision does the
rule espoused therein conform to a legitimate judicial purpose? (3) Is that
purpose contravened by all taxpayer suits or should Frothingham be
refined so as to identify acceptable taxpayer litigation?
Reviewing Frothingham, the Flast Court found that the Frothingham
rule constituted a policy decision which, though pointed at a legitimate
goal, was overbroad in its exclusion of all federal taxpayer actions.85 Not
only did the discussion of "attendant inconveniences" 86 suggest a non-
constitutional basis for the decision, but the Frothingham court discussed
no constitutional impediment to floodgate litigation or to litigation of
common injuries; truly, the case and controversy requirement of article
III does not go this far. 87 Such a judicially formulated policy of
self-restraint should "be disregarded when compelling reasons for assum-
79. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
80. 20 U.S.C. § 241 (1965).
81. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (1967).
82. Such appeal is allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1948).
83. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . U.S. CONST. amend. I.
84. 392 U.S. at 85.
85. The identification of standing as a rule at least partially derived from judicial
discretion and policies, has been reiterated as lately as Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490(1975),in
which the Court noted that the standing determination in any case "involves both constitu-
tional limitations on federal court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercises." Id.
at 498. (emphasis added).
86. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923). See note 73 and accompanying
text supra.
87. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
ing jurisdiction over a taxpayer's suit exist." 88 The Frothingham policy
becomes even less valid upon examination of the reasoning that supported
that policy formulation.
The dismissal of the analogy between Mrs. Frothingham and a
municipal taxpayer plaintiff loses its justification with the realization that
the federal taxes paid by large corporations give them a much larger
pecuniary stake in federal expenditures than in any municipal ones.
89
Furthermore, the fear of judicial inundation, for whatever limited persua-
siveness it has, should be allayed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and their acceptance of joinder 90 and class action suits. 9 The Flast Court
does not deal with the historical argument advanced in Frothingham, but it
might easily have noted that the same court that placed "much signifi-
cance" 92 on Mrs. Frothingham's failure to point to a case in which
taxpayer standing had been recognized had explained two paragraphs
earlier that in every previous case in which that issue arose they had either
ignored it or expressly declined to resolve it.
The Flast Court, having decided that Frothingham represented a
judicially created barrier that was unduly restrictive, relaxed the barrier by
recognizing that the question of standing is necessarily intertwined with the
question of substance. There must be a "logical nexus between the status
asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." 93 In order to determine
whether or not the plaintiff is the appropriate person to bring an action, at
least a cursory examination of the cause of action is necessary. The Flast
Court concluded that a taxpayer would be the proper person to bring a
88. Id. at 93.
89. Id. at 94.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 23. But see Comment, The Vitiation of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE
L.J. 1577 (July, 1970), in which the writer ingeniously points out a possible limitation on the
Flast doctrine. In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the Court ruled that in class actions
the members of a class may not aggregate their claims in order to meet the minimum amount in
controversy requirement of federal jurisdiction. This rule was extended with Zahn v.
International Paper, 414 U.S. 291 (1973), in which the Court said that each member of the
class, not just the named ones, must meet the amount in controversy requirement. Just as
Flast was a class action, 392 U.S. at 85, so must be the vast majority of taxpayer suits since
only a large corporate taxpayer will be able to allege a financial stake in any particular
government action in excess of the minimum amount in controversy. The comment writer
feels that Snyder, and we might add, from our vantage point at this later date, Zahn, has made
Flast an illusory victory for the taxpayer plaintiff; although he now has a limited standing to
sue in the federal courts, those courts now lack subject matter jurisdiction to hear his case.
The comment writer goes on to solve this dilemma by suggesting that the courts adopt a more
"defendant-oriented" definition of minimum amount in controversy. In other words, look to
see what an adverse finding would cost the defendant instead of how a favorable one would
profit the plaintiff. The plaintiff who sues to enjoin a two million dollar business enterprise,
though his own alleged injury is small, would have the minimum amount in controversy under
the defendant-oriented point of view. Failing this judicial action, the comment writer sees an
overruling of Snyder and a legislative repudiation of its principle as the taxpayer plaintiff's
only chances. His concern seems ungrounded, however, as the explicit approval of tax-
payers' class actions in Flast, 392 U.S. at 94, seems to protect these suits from the threat of
Snyder and Zahn. At any rate the courts have continued to allow taxpayers to sue as a class.
See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Stanton
v. Ash, 384 F. Supp. 625 (S.D. Ind. 1974); Richardson v. Kennedy, 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D.
Pa. (1970).
92. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
93. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
public action if the action satisfied a two-pronged logical nexus test.9 4
First, the plaintiff must challenge a legislative action authorized by the
taxing and spending clauses of the Constitution. Second, the plaintiff must
point to a specific portion of the Constitution that limits the congressional
taxing and spending powers. This test is consistent with Frothingham, the
Court insisted, in that Mrs. Frothingham, though she pointed to an article I,
section 8 expenditure act and thereby satisfied the first part of the test, had
only a generalized constitutional grievance concerning federal invasion of
state soveriegnty. No specific constitutional limitation on congressional
spending was involved, but rather a mere violation of the tenth amend-
ment; the lack of specificity spelled Mrs. Frothingham's defeat. Mrs.
Flast, on the other hand, in addition to challenging an expenditure, alleged
that the expenditure contravened the specific limitation of establishment
and free exercise prohibitions. The Court in Flast painstakingly em-
phasized the gravity with which the drafters had viewed the separation of
church and state.
Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared
by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its
adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used
to favor one religion over another or to support religion in
general. James Madison . . . observed . . . that 'the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only
of his property for the support of any one establishment, may
force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever.' 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 186 (Hunt ed.
1901). The concern of Madison and his supporters was quite
clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the victim if
government could employ its taxing and spending powers to aid
one religion over another or to aid religion in general. The
Establishment Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against
such potential abuses of government power, and that clause of
the First Amendment operates as a specific constitutionallimita-
tion upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending
power conferred by Act I, § 8.95
The question of what makes this clause a "specific" limitation while
others are considered "general" is crucial to post-Flast standing determi-
nations. The Court, however, furnished no criteria for resolving this
question96 but simply stated that "whether the Constitution contains other
94. Id.
95. Id. at 103. (emphasis added).
96. The concurring and dissenting opinions seem to recognize this deficiency, but their
proposed resolutions, of course, differ. Mr. Justice Harlan claimed, in his dissent, that the
nexus test does not in fact classify taxpayer actions into categories of real and illusory injuries
and so is "unrelated to . . .the determination of standing." He would have maintained the
Frothinghtam barrier to taxpayer plaintiffs. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion,
agreed with Harlan's criticism that the majority's rule lacked durability. He, however,
advocated immediate abrogation of the Frothingham rationale by eliminating at least the
second requirement of the nexus test. Any constitutional violation should, in Douglas' view,
generate taxpayer standing. Justices Stewart and Fortas took an intermediate position and,
though concurring in the decision, suggested a limitation of taxpayer standing to establish-
ment and free exercise cases. Id. at 130 (Harlan, J., dissenting);Id. at 107 (Douglas, J.
concurring); Id. at 114 (Stewart, J. concurring); Id. at 115 (Fortas, J. concurring)
specific limitations can be determined only in the context of future
cases.'"
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C. Post-Flast Limitations on Taxpayer Standing
There are at least three grounds upon which a taxpayer plaintiff may
be found to lack standing qua taxpayer after Flast v. Cohen. First, the
action he challenges might not be a congressional action authorized by the
taxing and spending clause; this may be true either because the action is not
legislative in origin, or because it is authorized by another clause of article
I. Second, the court might find that the constitutional limitation allegedly
violated by the expenditure is not specific enough to satisfy the second
requirement of the nexus test; unfortunately, the lack of guidelines on this
subject leaves the plaintiff without a good basis for predicting his chances
and the courts with essentially unbridled discretion. Third, the challenged
action might not, in fact, have caused the plaintiff any economic injury.
1. Requirement of Taxing and Spending Clauses Authorization
(a) Necessity of legislative action.--The first requirement under Flast is
that the plaintiff must challenge a legislative action under the taxing and
spending clauses.9" Thus, a taxpayer may not challenge federal action
emanating from the executive branch. In Morrison v. Callaway99 plaintiff
sued to prevent General Alexander Haig from serving as both Presidential
aide and active military officer. The specific constitutional infringement
alleged was a violation of the seventh clause of article I, section 9, which
forbids the drawing of money from the treasury "but in Consequence of
Appropriation made by Law." 100 Plaintiff further alleged the violation of a
federal statute prohibiting an active military officer from holding a civil
office. 10 ' The court never reached a determination of the adequacy of the
constitutional allegation because of plaintiff's failure to meet the first
prong of the Flast test. Though plaintiff argued for an extension of Flast to
include executive action of the type attacked, the court answered that the
novelty of the Flast rule demanded a strict application and allowed only an
occasional and slight lowering of the Frothingham barrier. This deference
to history, while detrimental to the expansion of legal remedies, seems
appropriate in this case, as Flast had explicitly foreclosed the issue.0 2
The exclusion of cases challenging expenditures incidental to regula-
tory programs caused the failure of plaintiff in Tax Analysts & Advocates
v. Simon. 103 Here plaintiff, a nonprofit organization organized to promote
97. Id. at 105.
98. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
99. 369 F. Supp. 1160 (D.D.C. 1974).
100. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7.
101. 10 U.S.C. § 973(b) (1968).
102. "[A] taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of
exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
103. 390 F. Supp. 927 (D.D.C. 1975).
tax study and reform, sought to challenge Internal Revenue Service rulings
that allowed tax credits for payments to foreign oil producers. Though the
alleged unconstitutionality was unclear, the court did not address that issue
but disallowed standing on the ground that plaintiff did not attack the
Internal Revenue Act as a whole, but merely an administrative ruling.
Challenges to regulatory promulgations are explicitly prohibited by
Flast. 104
A similar fate befell the plaintiff in Szmodis v. Romney 105 who sought
to enjoin meetings and negotiations that were to result in the awarding of a
Housing and Urban Development turnkey construction contract.' 06 The
contract, which allegedly contravened HUD regulations, was granted to
another and plaintiff argued that his constitutionally guaranteed right to
work was violated, depriving him of due process and equal protection. The
challenged expenditure was, however, determined to be merely an execu-
tive grant and not an exercise of the congressional spending power. Here
too Flast dictated the outcome. 
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(b) Necessity of action under the taxing and spending clause.-The
authorization of spending by a constitutional provision other than the
taxing and spending clause also defeats the taxpayer plaintiff. In Atlee v.
Laird,10 8 a case in which plaintiffs sought to convene a three-judge district
court to enjoin appropriations for the war in Southeast Asia, a federal
district judge denied taxpayer standing on the ground that those appropria-
tions were authorized by the war-making clauses' 9 and not by the taxing
and spending clauses. Denials of standing on this theory should be viewed
with the realization that the question of spending authorization is a
controversial one. Scholarly authority asserts that all government expendi-
tures are probably exercises of the spending power, "even if the disburse-
ment is also supported by some other granted power." 10 The Atlee court
recognized this controversy and evaded it. Because the plaintiff was
granted standing on another theory, " ' I this particular question has not yet
104. "It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
105. 307 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
106. A turnkey construction project is one in which the developer proposes to build a
public housing facility on land which he either owns or can obtain. He submits this proposal to
both the Department of Housing and Urban Development and a local housing authority. If the
two agencies agree, a contract will be negotiated requiring the local authority to purchase the
completed facility.
107. See note 102 supra. See also Hallman v. Phillips, 409 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
in which plaintiff was prevented from challenging an executive expenditure by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration.
108. 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
109. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cls. 11-16.
110. "[T]he government probably uses its spending power whenever it spends.
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHi. L. REV. 601,633 (1967,68). The matter is
further confused by the fact that "many activities are neither primarily spending nor primarily
regulatory .. "Id.
11l. The Atlee court gave the plaintiff "injury in fact" standing based upon the
war-caused inflation, conservational standing based upon his interest in preserving human
life, and motivational standing based upon his suffering from his knowledge of the widespread
death and destruction wrought by the war.
received appellate attention.' 12
2. Requirement of a Violation of a Specific Limitation.-The
narrow ruling of Flast-that the separation of church and state can be
enforced through federal taxpayer suits-has paved the way for several
similar actions." 3 The federal district courts, however, seem to be await-
ing Supreme Court designation of what other specific constitutional
violations will trigger Flast. The seeds of this hesitation were sown by the
cautionary language of the Flast decision and nurtured by the conservative
concurrences of Justices Stewart and Fortas. Justice Douglas sought to
prevent this with his appeal for more liberalized standards; nevertheless,
taxpayers with a nonreligious constitutional grievance have so far been left
without judicial remedy.
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In Richardson v. Kennedy'15 plaintiff challenged a statute 116 that
established a commission to review congressional salaries and make
suggestions to the President. The statute further provided that the President
would then make recommendations, based upon these suggestions, to
Congress, which could adopt or modify them at its discretion. The specific
unconstitutionality alleged was a violation of article I, section 6, which
declares that congressional salaries must be "ascertained by Law," 117 the
violation allegedly occurring because that phrase requires a congressional
initiation of any salary review. The court, however, did not consider the
merits of this allegation, but summarily dismissed plaintiff's attempt to
achieve standing under Flast, holding that article I, section 6 was not a
specific enough limitation on the spending power. The justification for this
conclusion is not clear since the district court made no attempt to explain its
rationale.
Congressional expenditures in support of the United Nations were
challenged in Boesel v. Schultz." 8 The gravamen of the complaint was
that, by accepting the United Nations Charter, the United States necessar-
ily agreed to concede to the International Court of Justice jurisdiction over
all treaty adjudication involving the United States. 19 Plaintiff pointed to
article III of the Constitution, 120 which vests power over United States
treaties in the federal judiciary, and argued that this vesting limited
congressional power to spend money in opposition thereto. The district
112. In the three-judge district court the plaintiff lost on the ground that, although he had
standing, the Viet Nam War question was a political one and so not justiciable. Atlee v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Indeed, there is much
appellate authority for this position. See, e.g., Pietch v. President of the United States, 434
F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969).
113. See, e.g., Dicenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970);Tilton v. Finch, 312
F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970).
114. We must remember the virtue of specificity that the Flast court inexplicably found
in the freedom of religion clauses. See note 95 and accompanying text supra.
115. 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
116. 2 U.S.C. § 351-61 (1967).
117. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
118. 388 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
119. Plaintiff contended that the International Court of Justice, along with concessions
of federal jurisdiction, is a crucial part of the United Nations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
120. U.S. CONST. art. 111.
court disagreed, stating that Flast should be read narrowly and with the
recognition that it represents an exception to the Frothingham rule and not
a new doctrine unto itself. The vesting of treaty jurisdiction has none of the
extraordinary properties of freedom of religion, so the general prohibition
must prevail.12 1
Several cases 122 have denied taxpayers standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Viet Nam conflict. Meyers v. Nixon,'123 in which
plaintiffs asserted that they had lost their rights under the declaration of war
clause, 124 namely that the duty of Congress to declare war limited its right
to spend money to wage a long term hostility, is illustrative. The failure of
this check on the spending power allegedly caused plaintiffs to suffer
increased tax liability. The district court rejected this contention, conclud-
ing that the declaration of war clause is not an adequate Flast limitation.
Plaintiffs had no standing as taxpayers and, therefore, any litigation would
have constituted an airing of "generalized grievances" of the kind
repeatedly condemned.I2 5 Here again, the judicial reasoning is not clear.
Certainly, unjustly waged war is potentially, at least, as great an evil as the
purchase of arithmetic books for a parochial school challenged by Mrs.
Flast. Nonetheless, applying the present standing theories to the decision in
Meyers, it appears that a taxpayer has a greater stake in the latter atrocity
than in the former.
Similarly, in Szmodis v. Romney 126 the court buttressed its rejection
of plaintiff's standing contentions with the declaration that the due process
clause of the fifth amendment does not limit the spending power specifical-
ly enough to allow a taxpayer to achieve standing under Flast. 1
27
The tendency to reject suggested spending power limitations was
reinforced by the Supreme Court in 1974 in United States v. Richard-
son. 128 The plaintiff in Richardson sought to obtain a declaration that the
Central Intelligence Agency Act,' 29 which allows the director's certificate
to constitute the only disclosure of Agency expenditures, was unconstitu-
tional. This provision, plaintiff asserted, violated the Constitution in that it
did not satisfy the requirement of article I, section 8 that "a regular
Statement and Account of the receipts and Expenditures of all Public
Money shall be published from time to time." 130 Plaintiff further alleged
that, upon requesting a copy of the CIA budget, he received only a
121. 388 F. Supp. at 773.
122. See note 108 and accompanying text supra. See also Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178
(9th Cir. 1972); Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
123. 339 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
125. See, e.g., S. v. D.,410U.S.614(1973);Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5thCir.
1969); Wheless v. Mellon, 10 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson,
265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967).
126. 307 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
127. Id. at 610.
128. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
129. 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (1944).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
"Combined Statement of Receipts, Expenditures and Balances of the
United States Government" and that this document was an incomplete
disclosure of the Agency's budget. Plaintiff asserted standing as a tax-
payer; the Court denied him standing under Flast.
The denial, however, did not rest on any insufficiency of the alleged
constitutional violation. Rather, the Court concerned itself with the nature
of the challenged governmental activity.
Although the status he rests on is that he is a taxpayer, his
challenge is not addressed to the taxing or spending power but to
the statutes regulating the C.I.A ...
[H]e asks the courts to compel the Government to give him
information on precisely how the C.I.A. spends its funds. Thus
there is no 'logical nexus' between the asserted status of tax-
payer and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the
Executive to supply a more detailed report of the expenditures of
that agency. 3'
Another supposed deficiency of plaintiff's claim is suggested by a
passage from the dissent of Mr. Justice Stewart:
Seeking a determination that the Government owes him a
duty to supply the information he has requested, the respondent
is in the position of a traditional Hohfeldian plaintiff. He con-
tends that the Statement and Account Clause gives him a right to
receive the information and burdens the Government with a
correlative duty to supply it. Courts of law exist for the resolu-
tion of such right-duty disputes. . . . If the duty in question
involved the payment of a sum of money, I suppose that all
would agree that a plaintiff asserting the duty would have
standing to litigate the issue of his entitlement to the money upon
a showing that he had not been paid.' 32
Thus, the Richardson plaintiff's problem was not his failure to
specify a satisfactory limitation on the spending power but rather his error
in challenging the wrong type of activity. His allegation that he could not
make an acceptable attack on CIA expenditures without the information he
sought was of no help. Without the benefit of Flast standing, plaintiff's
only chance was to show "injury in fact" of the type that Justice Stewart
would allow. 133 The Court was not ready to recognize information depriva-
tion as an injury to a cognizable interest.
In the short time since it was handed down, Richardson has been used
at least twice to justify a denial of Flast standing on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to satisfy the second part of the nexus test. In Civic
Awareness of America v. Richardson'34 the court said, "The vitality of
the Frothingham limitation on federal taxpayer suits as well as the
narrowness of the Flast test for taxpayer standing are made evident by the
Court's . . .decision in United States v. Richardson .... 135 It then
131. 418 U.S. at 175.
132. 418 U.S. at 203 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
133. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
134. 387 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
135. Id. at 1088.
proceeded to reject the theory that the establishment clause limited Con-
gress' power to spend money in support of birth control programs. In
Boesel v. Schultz 136 the court's rejection of article III as a spending power
limitation likewise follows citation to Richardson and an expression of the
need for a narrow reading of Flast.137 An analysis of the Richardson
decision, however, shows that there the Court did not address the spending
power limitations in the Flast test, but rather, plaintiff's failure to allege a
taxing and spending clause expenditure. Thus, the citations to Richardson
seem inappropriate and the reasoning of Civic Awareness and Boesel
consequently falls apart.
3. Requirement of an Economic Injury.-The third reason that a
plaintiff often fails to achieve standing is that the complaint includes no
allegation of an injury in fact caused by the unconstitutional legislative
enactment. Although only one federal case has recognized this third prong
of the Flast test, the recognition is theoretically sound, especially consider-
ing the distinction between taxpayer standing and citizen standing. Clear-
ly, just as the substance of the cause of action must bear a logical
connection to the standing as taxpayer, so too must the nature of the injury
alleged. As taxes are economic payments and the gravamen in all taxpayer
suits must necessarily be improper use of tax dollars leading to increased
tax liability, the injury is purely a financial one. Unlike cases of motiva-
tional or citizen standing, the taxpayer standing cases need not involve
plaintiffs who seek to vindicate emotional or spiritual beliefs regarding the
propriety of public spending. Though plaintiffs commonly assert the
statuses of citizen and taxpayer in combination, the courts must remember
that the requisites for each are distinct and that individual scrutiny is
required. 1
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In Evans v. Lynn 139 plaintiffs sought to restrain two federal agencies
from supplying a town with funds for the construction of sewer facilities on
the ground that the town's racially preclusive policies violated the civil
rights of minority groups. Plaintiffs sued as taxpayers but were denied
Flast standing on the basis of their failure to allege injury in the form of
increased tax liability. Presumably, they could easily have done so and
forced the court to decide whether guarantees of civil rights will satisfy the
second prong of the nexus test. The complexity of this area, however, has
resulted in inadequate pleadings by more than one plaintiff with a real
claim. '40
136. 388 F. Supp. 771 (S.D. Ohio 1975). See notes 118-21 and accompanying text supra.
137. Id. at 773.
138. Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Reservists Committee to Stop the
War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971).
139. 376 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
140. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see also note 44 and accompanying
text supra. The complexity has also resulted in an occasional case of fuzzy judicial thinking.
After evaluating the plaintiff's contention of taxpayer standing in Knoxville Progressive
Christian Coalition v. Testerman, 404 F. Supp. 783 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), the court found that
contention wanting:
IV. Alternatives to Taxpayer Standing
Having deprived the plaintiff of Flast benefits and rejected his
"injury in fact" proposal, the Court leaves him in the position of any
common citizen who seeks the judiciary's aid in enforcing the law. A case
decided the same day as Richardson sheds some light on his problems.
In Schlesigner v. Reservists to Stop the War 4 ' plaintiffs sued as
taxpayers and citizens in their attempt to prevent certain members of
Congress from serving as members of the Armed Forces Reserve. They
alleged a violation of the incompatability clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion,142 which provdes that "no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during the Continuance in
Office." The assertion of taxpayer standing had the obvious, and fatal,
deficiency of plaintiffs' failure to challenge a taxing and spending expendi-
ture. No "logical nexus'' 4 3 existed between a challenge of executive
action and the taxpayer status.'4
Nor did plaintiffs succeed in establishing their standing as citizens. In
rejecting this type of standing the Court reaffirmed a well-entrenched
doctrine that has an intimate relation to the federal distaste of advisory
opinions.
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individu-
al to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
executive or legislative action he must show that he has sus-
tained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as
the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely
a general interest common to all members of the public.
145
This is merely a recognition of the need for some cognizable injury 146 and a
The only alleged nexus between his status as a taxpayer and this action is that he
may face the prospect of payment of additional taxes if the funds in question here
are spent on ineligible projects. This alleged interest in the action is too tenuous to
satisfy the requirement that the plaintiff have "a personal stake in the controversy"
in order to warrant invocation of federal jurisdiction.
Id. at 788. It seems clear that increased tax liability is the only injury ever available to the
taxpayer plaintiff qua taxpayer and plaintiff here was the victim of judicial misunderstanding.
141. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
143. The taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific
constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing
and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the
powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
144. Accord, Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court did
not allow plaintiff to challenge the constitutionality of the Economic Opportunity Act or the
Office of Economic Opportunity's director's maintenance of legal aid programs, since his
failure to allege any specific constitutional limitation caused a similar failure to" 'establish a
nexus between [taxpayer] status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged.' " Id. at 174.
145. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
146. Here again the court has explicated the essence of standing. Although the recogni-
tion of justiciable interests has qualitatively expanded, Association of Data Processing
Services Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), "broadening the categories of
injury that may be alleged in support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury." Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
reemphasis of the requirement that there be a "concrete injury [that]
presents the factual context within which a court, aided by parties who
argue within the context, is capable of making decisions." 147 The Court
does not answer the obvious question of why a case loses concreteness
because the injury is shared by a large number of people. It would seem that
as long as the allegations are sufficiently particular and the issues carefully
framed, adequate concreteness should exist. Nonetheless, once the plain-
tiff in a citizen-taxpayer action has lost his Flast benefits, he too nearly
resembles the motivational plaintiff upon whom the courts look with
disfavor. 148
V. Recommendations
Since the standing doctrine is a judicially created rule, 149 there is no
reason that the courts cannot more clearly define it. Excessive exclusion
has resulted from the fear of the federal courts that they will become the
automatic regulators of legislative activity. 150 In the famous words of
Justice Holmes, the other branches of government "are ultimately guard-
ians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as
the courts."' 151 If some grants of standing would result in "a pro tanto
destruction of our most cherished federal system of Government,""'5 then
Congress can solve this problem by limiting jurisdiction to cases involving
certain types of standing-injury in fact, for example. That Congress has
this power is no longer open to doubt. 153 Legislative control of standing
147. Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974).
Accord, White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 151 (D. Md. 1974), in which the
court noted that,
[l]t goes too far to say that an individual who appoints himself a private attorney
general . . . need have no personal stake in the [litigation]. . . . [A]n individual
must first have personal standing before he can represent the public interest as a
private attorney general. It is the responsibility of a federal court to resolve only
concrete disputes which have been brought before it for decision.
Id. at 157.
148. In Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967), plaintiffs
sought to have the fourteenth amendment declared invalid due to alleged improprieties during
its ratification. The court disallowed this challenge since plaintiff's concern with the subject
matter was clearly no more particularized than that of the public at large. In Janda v. State of
Illinois, 348 F. Supp. 568 (N.D. I11. 1972), plaintiffs were state employees who were
discharged to make room for political favorites. They sued as citizens, taxpayers, and
improperly fired state employees. The court disallowed their citizen standing but allowed
their standing under the other two categories. This case points out the value of alleging
multiple standing statuses and forcing the courts to scrutinize them individually.
The impact of Schlesinger on citizen standing has been considerable. Though no later
Supreme Court cases have spoken so strongly, the language of the Fifth Circuit seems fair:
"[Tlhe thin ice which may have supported generalized citizen standing to pursue 'public
actions' before Schlesinger melted with that case." Korioth v. Briscoe, 523 F.2d 1271, 1276
(5th Cir. 1975). Similarly, the observation of the Seventh Circuit that "Itihe Supreme Court
has never found the generalized interest of a citizen to be sufficient to confer standing," Reich
v. City of Freeport, 527 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1975), seems to have anticipatory as well as
historical validity.
149. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See also Berger, Standing to Sue in Public
Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Jaffe, Standing to Sue
to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1961).
150. See note 16 supra.
151. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
152. Maryland Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823,825 (D. Md. 1967), quoting
from plaintiffs' allegations.
153. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
would, at least, have the virtue of certainty. The irregular use of standing as
an apparent means of docket control cannot help but reduce public
confidence in the judiciary. 1
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Until such legislation is passed, the courts should use standing only to
ensure precise issue formulation and to avoid advisory opinions. 55 Flast
should be read at least for the proposition that whenever the plaintiff alleges
a congressional exercise of the spending power that contravenes a constitu-
tional prohibition or mandate, he may stand to attack it. The need for
specificity has been used to frustrate suits without explanation and prevents
accurate prediction of a litigant's chances. The Richardson authority for a
strict requirement of specificity is inappropriate and the alternative to
taxpayer litigation is inadequate.
Lack of standing . ..does not impair the right [of the
plaintiff] to assert his views in the political forum or at the polls.
Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive though the traditional
electoral system may be thought at times, our system provides
for changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied
citizens convince a sufficient number of their fellow electors that
elected representatives are delinquent in performing duties com-
mitted to them.
5 6
While theoretically sound, the theory that "dissatisfied citizens" can
vindicate their interests by replacing enough distasteful legislators at the
polls has such practical difficulties as to be realistically untenable. When
the issues are precise, the adversity real, the questions capable of judicial
resolution, the requested remedy appropriate and available and the con-
troversy continuing, the courts should not place valuable constitutional
rights in abeyance by denying the plaintiff standing to litigate the issues.
Fear of a floodgate of litigation 157 or litigation of minute issues 58 should
not force injustice of the sort.
When the judiciary is no longer "a great rock" in the storm,
. . .when the courts are niggardly in the use of their power and
154. This irregularity is manifest in the pre-Flast cases in which the plaintiff evidently
had no "concrete injury" to allege. For example, in Hamilton v. Board of Regents, Univ. of
Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934), plaintiffs sued as citizens and taxpayers to prevent a deprivation
of liberty without due process in derogation of the United States Constitution. The alleged
violation was compulsory military study. The Court never discussed standing.
Even more surprising is Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), in which plaintiff
challenged the appropriation of money to support a hospital whose directors were members of
a religious and monastic order. Defendants raised the question of standing, apparently
germane since plaintiff sued as a citizen and taxpayer. The Court, however, announced that it
would overlook "objections made to the maintenance of this suit on account of an alleged
defect of parties and also in regard of the character in which plaintiff sues: merely that of a
citizen and taxpayer." Id. at 295.
155. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
156. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
157. "There need be no inundation of the federal courts if taxpayers' suits are allowed.
There is a wise judicial discretion that usually can distinguish between the frivolous question
and the substantial question. ... Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 112 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
158. A legitimate claim loses no justiciability because of its small size. In Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), plaintiff was allowed to litigate the constitu-
tionality of a $1.50 poll tax. Indeed, Mrs. Flast's share of the Education Act expenditure has
been estimated at twelve cents. See Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
reach great issues only timidly and reluctantly, the force of the
Constitution in the life of the Nation is greatly weakened. 5 9
If the courts continue to hesitate in the exercise of their power, grave
questions must necessarily go unanswered, citizens must wonder about the
efficiency of the judicial process, and the theoretical structure of the
Constitution must suffer from the diminished understanding of its premises
that results from the paucity of authoritative declaration.
VI. Conclusion
The doctrine of standing has become unduly confused with other
aspects of justiciability and consequently has limited access to federal
courts to an extent unjustified by the judicial policy of self restraint.
Taxpayer standing in particular has not been granted to the degree
theoretically approved by Flast v. Cohen. Federal courts have used the
Flast test as a limitation without explaining how the plaintiff failed to
achieve standing. The results have been uncertainty as to the meaning of
Flast, inability to estimate a plaintiff taxpayer's chances, and a rigid
confinement of the Flast rule to freedom of religion cases.
This conservatism is both unnecessary and unfortunate. The Flast test
could easily be construed to allow frequent and productive taxpayer
litigation; only history and the remembrance of Frothingham stand in the
way. Much of the reverence for the Frothingham rule revolves around the
concern over a flood of inconsequential litigation, a concern that appears
groundless.
The haphazard application of Flast, evidently due to both caprice and
caution, has forced needless sacrifice of constitutional rights determina-
tions. The proper course for the future is either a legislative definition of
taxpayer standing or a realization by the federal judiciary that its powers are
meant to be exercised in a manner that will strengthen, not threaten, the
federal system.
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159. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 112 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).

